This paper also provides a theoretical analysis of the effect enforcement has on smuggling and welfare.
Introduction
The literature on illegal transactions suggest that smuggling may reduce welfare over the non-smuggling situation.
In this essay a model of firm behavior is developed which allows smuggling to be a viable option in addition to legal trade for the domestic firm involved in international trade. The results of the "parallel market" model developed in this essay indicate that if smuggling is not welfare enhancing, regardless of the real resource cost, smuggling will end.
In addition, the parallel market model allows the effect of government enforcement on smuggling to be examined. The model demonstrates that increased enforcement has a negative impact on smuggling and, more importantly, a negative impact on welfare.
The seminal paper on illegal transactions by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) analyzed the welfare implications of smuggling for a small country that imposed a non-prohibitive tariff on imports.
Their analysis produced two substantive results. First, under the assumption of perfect competition in the domestic market for imports and the presence of a domestic price differential between legal and illegal goods, illegal trade will dominate the domestic market for imports. In this case a unique welfare ranking is not possible. 1 Second, when it was assumed illegal goods sell at the full duty domestic price, legal and illegal trade coexist in the domestic market. The presence of smuggling, however, has a negative effect on welfare. Bhagwati and Hansen's results cast doubt on the widely held view that smuggling improves welfare in that it constitutes a partial or total evasion of welfare reducing tariffs. 2 One weakness of the Bhagwati and Hansen model is its inability to sustain both legal and illegal trade when the domestic price of illegal imports is below the theoretical full duty price for imports.
In the real world, legal and illegal trade coexist, with the domestic price of imports being below what the theoretical full duty price should be.
Empirical evidence validating this phenomena is provided by
Richard empirical study of import smuggling in Indonesia. Cooper examined the effect of smuggling on the wholesale market price of goods subject to varying tariff levels.
Cooper's results revealed that the average wholesale market price of a good subjected to a tariff was only 82% of what the good's tariff inclusive price should be. This result was for goods with a tariff rate of 0% to 100%. For goods that were subject to tariffs of 100% to 200%, only 39% of the tariff increment above 100% was reflected in the average wholesale price. An increase in tariff rates above 258% resulted in a actual reduction in the average wholesale price. 3 The first theoretical paper focusing on the domestic price effect of smuggling was published by Pitt (1981) . Pitt developed a model of export smuggling based on a smuggling production function for firms that use legal export trade as a cover for their illegal export trade. For the smuggling firm, legal and illegal exports become a joint product of the firm. The average price of the joint export product is greater than the price of exports in the non-smuggling situation. Price disparity is a term Pitt coined for the empirically valid phenomenon of exports selling above their theoretical full duty domestic price. 4 Pitt's model demonstrates that price disparity and the coexistence of legal and illegal trade are possible. Pitt obtains this result because all firms in his model smuggle and legal and illegal exports are joint products of exporting firms.
Pitt's model, however, incorporates passive government enforcement and lacks a decision process to explain of why one firm will smuggle and another will not. These characteristics of Pitt's model produce smuggling's ambiguous welfare effect when smuggling incurs a real resource cost.
3 Martin and Panagariya (1984) introduced the crime theoretic approach to the analysis of import smuggling. This approach explicitly allows them to incorporate the uncertainty associated with smuggling. As in the Pitt model, however, their analysis fails to provide an explanation of why one firm will smuggle and another will not. The strong assumptions of firm risk neutrality, that all import firms smuggle, and that the smuggling firm sets its own probability of detection generate their ambiguous welfare results.
The three major goals of this essay are: 1) to develop a model that allows varying degrees of firm risk aversion to exist in the export industry; 2) to provide an analysis of the interaction effect of varying degrees of firm risk aversion with different levels of government enforcement on total smuggling and a country's social welfare; 3) to present a general explanation of the coexistence of firms involved in legal trade only with firms that smuggle when there is a tax wedge driven between the world and domestic price of a good.
For the convenience of the reader an outline of the essay is provided. Section (2) 
Assumptions
The analysis begins with the Pitt model of smuggling. It is assumed each firm can trade illegally according to "Pitt's smuggling function", (1) s* = G(L,S).
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The term (s*) is the quantity of good (X) smuggled, (L) is the quantity of good (X) legally traded and (S) is the quantity of good (X) input into smuggling activity. The function (G) is strictly concave and a twice differentiable linear homogenous function. The function (G) is also assumed to have the following properties: This modification assumes that successful ex-post smuggling is less than but approximately equal to ex-ante smuggling to comply with the strict concavity assumption imposed on the smuggling function (G) . This assumption allows an externalization of the effect enforcement has on smuggling in the Pitt model.
A Model of smuggling with Parallel Markets for Exports and Risk Aversion
In all previous articles on illegal trade, except for the one by Scholer (1989) , the trading firm had no choice with respect to smuggling. The assumption of parallel markets for exports opens up the possibility of firm choice: strictly legal trade or joint product export smuggling as in the Pitt model. This process will generate two distinct channels through which goods will flow. Then, it is conceivable that the law of one price is no longer valid inside the country. There are several domestic c·ondi tions which will promote the development of a parallel mar.ket~ 1) a domestic market for the export does not exist; 2) all firms, by law must sell their output to the government; and 3) ineffective enforcement of the tax laws.
It is assumed parallel markets for exports and the risk associated with smuggling affect firm behavior. In illegal trade the risk is due to government enforcement of the export tax laws.
The firm's decision to become involved in illegal trade, therefore, is based on the potential profits of smuggling and the uncertainty of those profits. alludes to a firm's "threshold of law abidingness," pertaining to a "threshold tariff. 118 I assume that the threshold export tax at which a firm will decide to become involved in illegal trade is determined by the uncertainty associated with illegal profits and the expected value of those
profits. An export tax set above this threshold will induce illegal trade, as illegal gains outweigh the economic consequences associated with being caught breaking the law.
It is assumed that each firm has a decision to make: the firm can engage in the Pitt type of smuggling or the firm can sell its output at the legal domestic export tax distorted price
If the firm decides to smuggle, it receives the weighted average price (P 5 ) for its output, equation (8) found below. If the firm decides to stay involved in legal trade, then strictly legal profits for the firm can be represented by the variable (Yl i) ,
For simplicity let equation (6) represent the firm's profit function for strictly legal export trade, (6) yli = yli(Pt, P').
The variable (P 1 ) is the price vector for domestic factor inputs used in the domestic production of exports (X), and (Pt) is the exported goods tax inclusive price or full duty domestic price of the domestically produced exported good (X). The function C(X, P 1 ) is the firm's cost function, and it is assumed the firm is a price taker in the domestic factor markets. The firm's domestic export production function is assumed to be strictly concave and thus exhibits diminishing returns in production. This restriction on the firm's production function guarantees the firm's average cost curves are (U) shaped.
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The firm's expected utility of profit function for legal trade is assumed to be twice differentiable and is denoted [E(U(Y\)) = uL;]· Legal trade is assumed to be a risk free activity.
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If the firm decides to become involved in joint product illegal trade, then its situation can be thought of as a lottery.
The expected value of the lottery is dependent on the following variables, (P;, ysi' Fi). The probability of apprehension (P) is determined by the government. The ith firm assumes its probability of being caught is (P;). Each firm can influence its probability of success at smuggling by using cloaking activities.
The expected value of (p) for the industry, however, is equal to the objective value of represents illegal profits for the individual profit maximizing firm,
10 Equation (7) represents total profits earned if the firm is successful in illegal trade. Equation (7) implies that legal and illegal trade in exports are considered a joint product of the smuggling firm. The firm's ex-ante output supply price is determined by the weighted average of legal and illegal trade.
The smuggler determines his average selling price of output (P 5 ) in order to calculate potential prof its coming from successful smuggling,
The expected value and variance of profit when the ith firm is involved in illegal trade, assuming there is not a real resource cost associated with smuggling, is given in equations (14) and (15), ( 14 ) E ( ys i ) = pi
The expected utility function for the firm if it smuggles, is assumed to be twice differentiable and is defined by equation
Conditions (17) and (18) hold given that the marginal utility of profit is positive as defined by condition (19),
( 1 7 )
The ith firm bases its decision to become involved in smuggling by comparing expected utilities derived from legal profit with those derived from illegal profit. Therefore, the firm is faced with a random profit (Y 5 i) and a certain profit (Yli). The firm's decision mechanism is based on a comparison of (Y 5 i) and (
and this comparison is given in equation (20),
Applying the theoretical results pertaining to risk and risk aversion developed by Pratt (1964) 
By employing the standard measure of absolute risk aversion,
, as the measure of the ith firm's attitude toward risk, the following conditions arise. The value of (7r/)
for the i th firm will be negative if (U">O); positive if (U" <O);
and zero if (U" =O) . This implies that the i th firm prefers, averts or is neutral towards risk respectively. The variable (7ri*) represents the insurance premium the firm would be willing to pay if it could insure itself against criminal penalties.
Therefore, (7r;*) represents the minimum level of risk premium necessary to induce the ith firm into smuggling. This implies that in equilibrium, at the margin, smugglers that are risk averse earn higher profits then they could in legal activities.
Smugglers who are risk preferrers earn lower profits then they could in legal trade. Smugglers who are risk neutral earn the same amount of profits as they could in legal trade. Hence, (7r*) serves as proxy for Cooper's "threshold of law abidingness. " 12 Whenever (11"; > 11";*) , the firm will become involved in smuggling if the firm is assumed to be risk averse or risk neutral as the following condition implies, (U" :s; O).
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It is now assumed that individual attitudes toward risk vary among domestic firms. Let (R) be a random variable that has a probability density function that generates a finite variance distribution. Attitudes range from risk neutrality (R~ O) to extreme risk aversion (R~ oo) with a lower bounded finite variance distribution for (R). This assumption implies individual firms displaying risk neutrality or extreme risk aversion are a small proportion of the export industry.
To expand on the concept of industry attitudes towards risk it is assumed that the expected value for the distribution of (R) is equal to (r,r>O), as defined by equation (22) below. Equation (22) implies that the industry's average view towards the risk associated with smuggling is risk averse,
From the initial assumption of identical firms with varying degrees of risk aversion, the expected value and variance of illegal profits for the representative firm are,
The decision of an individual firm to continue in only legal trade or to engage in smuggling is based on the comparison of legal prof its to the expected value of illegal prof its earned by smuggling. This decision process is represented by equations (25) and (26),
From equation (26) it is possible to derive (7r*), the minimum risk premium at which an individual firm in the industry is indifferent to legal or illegal trade. The level of ('Tr*) depends on the firms attitude towards risk, which is determined by (R).
It is assumed that the distribution of the attitudes towards risk for all firms in the industry is given by the probability density function, fr(r). The distribution of (R) is assumed to have a finite variance distribution for the industry. This implies that (7r*) also has a finite variance distribution for the industry and has a lower bound of zero, thus the minimum risk premium must always be non-negative. The probability density function for (7r*) can be defined as f.,. (7r*) • 13
For example, assume that, on average, the minimum risk premium for the industry is (7r,,.). This implies that the expected value of (7r*) is equal to (7r,,.), as given by condition (27),
. Im . .
Assume however, that the actual risk premium generated by the export tax, (7r), is some positive value, say (7r 1 ) .
Then there will be a set of risk averse firms involved in smuggling.
The proportion of the industry involved in smuggling can be determined by the definite integral defined below, Equations (8) and (30) 
The Welfare Effect of smuggling
In the last section it was demonstrated that whenever
for any firm or firms, a proportion of the industry will be involved in smuggling. The stage is now set for an examination of how the introduction of smuggling affects total exports, denoted (I). The small country assumption made earlier implies that the demand for exports is perfectly elastic. The amount of exports is therefore determined by supply. Assuming that the level of total exports, after the export tax is levied but before_ smuggling is introduced, is equal to xL 1 , ( 3 1 ) r 1 = xL 1
•
After smuggling is introduced, the level of total exports is equal to the sum of legal and illegal trade, Equation (33) demonstrates that the unit volume of illegal trade is greater than the change in unit volume of legal trade.
However, as in Pitt's paper, it can not be determined if legal trade increases or decreases because of the change in relative prices; thus, the effect on export tax revenues is ambiguous.
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The welfare effect of smuggling with parallel markets and varying degrees of risk aversion will now be examined. The analysis begins from a export tax distorted equilibrium point depicted in figure (1) in appendix (C): production and consumption are equal to (Pt, ct), and welfare is equal to (Vt).
The term (Vt) is an ex-post indirect social welfare function and is defined as [V(AWP,Y)].
In the non-smuggling case, the full duty price of exports If it is assumed government enforcement imposes a real cost on smuggling, as it was assumed in the earlier literature, then welfare levels are bounded by (VawpO) and (Vt). This can be demonstrated by first assuming the real cost of smuggling is due to real resources being used up in evasion or cloaking activities. Second, assume the expected value of punishment, (µ=p·F), is used by smugglers to determine the real resource cost of evasion tactics. As (P) or (F) increases, the value of (S*) declines as (Gs) declines; thus, (Ps) declines, as shown in equation (8) . Equations (19) and (10) imply expected illegal profits decline and the output from firms involved in illegal trade declines respectively. Therefore, the risk premium earned from smuggling is lower, causing the most risk averse smugglers to end their illegal activity. With fewer firms smuggling, the average wholesale price of exports will decline and domestic relative prices will deteriorate, welfare will decline as a result of the introduction of real cost' cvawpO > vawp 1 ) (see figure   1) •
The cost of smuggling is a mix of real resource cost and penalties-confiscation, with legal and illegal firms coexisting in the domestic market. 19 Therefore production and prices are independent of the cost mix but are not independent of the firm mix. Welfare is bounded by the cost and firm mix. This implies that as the level of real cost imposed on smuggling by enforcement approaches the export tax, the risk premium earned from smuggling is approaching zero. As the risk premium earned from smuggling declines, the number of firms smuggling declines.
As firms switch to legal trade only, the domestic average wholesale price of exports approaches the full duty price (Pt).
Once the real cost of smuggling exceeds the export tax, all smuggling will be eliminated. Production and consumption will be at (Pt, ct) and welfare (Vt). The export tax distorted equilibrium will be the final result. 
The Welfare Effect of Government Enforcement
The welfare analysis of smuggling in the economic literature has ignored the interaction between government enforcement and illegal transactions. 21 However, the Bhagwati and Hansen result of "the less smuggling the better" implies that government action should be taken against smugglers.
For the purpose of simplifying the analysis of this interaction, assume that government enforcement effort can be increased without any significant increase in cost. The government agency responsible for the enforcement of the export tax laws and reducing smuggling has three policy instruments at its disposal. First, it can increase enforcement activity to increase the probability of apprehending smugglers. Second, the government can increase the penalty for smuggling. Third, the government can lower the tax on exports. Based on the earlier results that smuggling reduces the negative welfare effect of the export tax, the welfare effect of changing each policy instrument is examined below.
The result of increasing the tax on exported goods in the parallel market model causes a decline in expected profits for smugglers and a decline in prof its for firms involved in legal trade only. This counter intuitive effect is the result of a fixed international price for the small country's exports and the smuggling firm producing a joint product for export. Equation (7) demonstrates that for a fixed level of domestic production the smuggling firm's successful smuggling profit level declines when the export tax is increased.
Equation (8) demonstrates, however, that the decline in (Ps) will be less than the decline in (Pt). This implies that the risk premium earned from smuggling, (~), will increase and induce more firms to smuggle. Total exports will decline, but the smuggler's market share will increase. This is what Cooper calls "the secondary effect": "With competition from smuggling of any type, what appears to an indirect tax, the export tax, becomes a direct tax on the income of he who pays it, for he can not pass it on to his customers."n The result of (Ps) declining by less than the increase in the export tax in the parallel market model is consistent with Cooper's empirical result of the domestic average wholesale price of imports increasing by less than the increase in the tariff.
Increasing government enforcement activity increases the probability of being caught in the illegal act of smuggling. As demonstrated in equations (14) and (17), increasing the probability of apprehension reduces expected profits and expected utility of illegal trade. This causes the number of firms involved in illegal trade to decline. Therefore, the welfare effect of an increase in the probability of apprehension is negative with respect to the results of the previous section.
If government enforcement is able to raise the probability of apprehension to one, illegal profits would equal (Ys-F) for firms involved in illegal activity. Setting the monetary penalty at infinity would eliminate all illegal trade. The export tax distorted equilibrium would be attained, if the probability of detection is non-zero.
The welfare results arising from a change in government enforcement in the parallel market model are in sharp contrast to the ambiguous welfare results found in the earlier literature.
In the parallel market model, as the real resource cost increases from increased enforcement, risk averse firms begin to switch from illegal to legal trade. With this assumption incorporated into the model, increased enforcement has an unambiguous negative welfare effect. Government not only affects expected profits from smuggling, but also imposes an increase in real cost on smuggling that is reflected in the smuggling function (G). Once the increase in real resource cost associated with smuggling becomes greater than the extra revenues earned from smuggling, all smuggling will end, if (U"<O).
Another interesting issue concerning government policy and smuggling is which policy tool is most effective in reducing smuggling. Extending the research of Becker (1968) , the effectiveness of (p) and (F) in reducing the amount of smuggling depends on the attitude toward risk of the traded goods industry.
Equations (34) and (35) 
It is possible to use equations (34) and (35) to determine which government policy instrument is most effective in reducing smuggling. A direct comparison of equations (34) and (35), results in condition (36) . It is now possible to perform an algebraic manipulation to arrive at condition (37). Condition (37) demonstrates that the individual relative effectiveness of the enforcement policy instruments is contingent on the attitude of the traded goods industry toward the risk associated with
Equation ( One other comparison can be made. The elasticity measure for the expected utility of illegal profit, equation (38) , with respect to the export tax is greater than the elasticities of the enforcement policy instruments,
The comparison of equation (38) to equations (34) and (35) demonstrates that reducing the export tax by one percent generates a larger percentage reduction in smuggling than does a one percent increase in government enforcement. This result holds if it is assumed, (U" SO).
Sheikh ( The mean-variance approach has several weakness that were not addressed by Sheikh. The literature on "choice under uncertainty" reveals that generally the mean-variance approach will not be able to reproduce the "true" rankings of the complete distributions generated by the expected utility hypothesis approach. 24 The mean-variance approach, when used to model the risk associated with smuggling, will only produce suitable approximations to the expected utility approach under one of the following conditions: 1) risks are small in some sense; 2) the distribution of smuggling profits must be normal; 3) the smuggling firm's utility function is quadratic. Sheikh's meanvariance model fails to make the necessary assumptions to meet any one of these three conditions.
Summary
The purpose of this essay is to extend the analysis of Otherwise, they may inflict a welfare loss upon their economies.
Appendix (A)
The profit maximization first order condition for equation ( 5) 
Appendix (B)
The profit maximization first order conditions for equation (7) are, (lb) 8Y/8L= pf.GL + pf. (1-t) (2b) 8Y/8S= pf.Gs -C/ = O.
The profit maximization second order conditions for equation (7) are,
( sb) a 2 y;as 2 = pf. G -c
The partial derivative (Gs) is the marginal product of exante smuggling in production of successful ex-post smuggling and is assumed to be positive. The partial derivative (GL) is the marginal product of legal trade in production of successful expost smuggling and is assumed to be positive. The partial derivative (Cx') is the marginal cost of domestic export production and is assumed to be positive. The second order partial derivatives (Gss> and (GLL) are assumed to be negative because of the strict concavity assumption imposed on (G). The cross partial derivatives, (GsL' GLs), are assumed positive and small. This implies that the marginal productivity of either input increases if the other input is increased. The second order partial derivative (Cx 11 ) represents the slope of the firm's marginal cost curve for domestic export production and is assumed to be positive because of the strict concavity assumption imposed on the exporting firm's production function for the domestic production of exports. The second order conditions for profit maximization hold when it is assumed that the cross partial derivatives are positive and small, and it should be noted that 32 it is assumed that changing (L) or (S) implies the production of exports (X) must increase. Under the assumption that second order conditions given in equation (7b) hold, the smuggling firm's profit function represented by equation (9) is well behaved. The variable (Q 5 ) represents the share of the export market that joint product smugglers control. Strictly legal trade will take equilibrium consumption to (cawp 1 ). Equilibrium domestic relative prices and welfare are (Pawp 1 ) and (Vawp 1 14. I shall assume that each exporting firm has equal weight in determining the domestic average wholesale price of exports.
15. Pitt (1981) , p.450.
16. Pitt (1981) , p. 454.
17. It should be noted that fines will be zero in the non-smuggling case.
18. The mathematical model developed here examines export smuggling: however, the geometry used in figure 1 ) applies equally to import and export smuggling in a manner analogous to the symmetry results demonstrated by Lerner (1936) for import and export taxes.
19.
The real resource cost of smuggling is the excess cost incurred over legal trade and is due to the cloaking activities employed to hide illegal activity from government enforcement.
20. This point was made by Sheikh (1990) .
21. The literature assumes government enforcement is constant. For example, see H.G. Johnson (1974) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1973) .
22. ), page 190. 23. Becker (1968 , used a similar approach in his analysis of the economics of crime., p.11.
24. For a discussion of this problem with the mean-variance approach, see Deaton and Muellbauer (1987), pp. 395-405. 
